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International aid for Gambian farrners is out of  neighbors - and remove it from their own
balance, concludes Parker Shipton.  temptation.
Interventions in this small, impoverished,  Some of the most imponant ways of saving
West African country have been based mainly  money (as in lutating credit and saving associa-
on credit (and thus on debt).  Public and private  tions) and other goods (as in grain storage)
lending institutions have failed dramatically and  combine principles of individual property and
debts are mounting, but lenders continue extend-  group control - prinriples that cou!d be cmu-
ing loans into the countryside.  lated in institutional finance, and that underlie
some well-known innovative programs in
Before suggesting better ways to help  Africa, sout'lerm  Asia, and Latin America.
Gambians alleviate poverty, Shipton answers the
question: How do Gambians save?  Gambian farmers choosing savings options
-weigh  trustworthiness and convenience more
Saving takes many forms other than just  heavily than real or nominal interest rates or
money - including livestock, jewelry, store  inflationary losses.  Some of their favorite ways
crops, and resaleable household goods.  Sdme  of saving are expensive.
forms are gender-specific, some secrct.  Some
farmers keep cash in sealed containers; some  There is room for new options. One of these
deposit it with trusted local "money-keepers;"  is for financial intennediaries to subsidize not
some ask for deferred wage or share-contract  credit - the standard approach - but savings.
payments.
Gainbians and others like them need a
Gambians do not prefer liquidity.  They  balance between credit and saving, liquidity and
often convert wealth into forms that shelter it  illiquidity, individualism and group responsibil-
from the daily demands of spouses, kin, and  ity.
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Bibliograjhy  57I.  INTRODUCTION
Juloo,  wrope"  to a  Mandinko,  means  several  things  at once.  It can refer
to  a small-scale  trader,  or  to  credit  or  debt.  Every  Mar.dinko  knows  the  meanings
are related.  Traders  are  also  lenders,  and  their  loans,  while  sometimes  useful
like  a rope ladder,  also tie  down  a farmer  like  a rope  around  the  neck.  When
rural  people  in  The  Gambia  speak  of  iuloo,  in  any  of  these  uses,  they  consciously
or  unconsciously  connote  slavery.  The  Mandinko  and  other  peoples  of this  small
and  impoverished  West  African  river  nation,  an  ancient  trade  route  winding  thinly
through  southern  Senegal,  have  had  occasion  in  history  to  learn  quite  a  bit  about
ropes  and  involuntary  servitude,  and  about  debt.  The  linked  images  and  overtones
are  not  empty  of emotion.
In  recent  decades,  international  interventions  in  Gambian  agriculture  have
been based  mainly  on credit.  Each year,  with mixed  motives,  new committees
convene  in Banjul,  the  capital,  to seek  new  ways of extending  loans  into the
countryside: representatives  of  multinational and  bilateral  agencies,
governmental  bodies,  private  voluntary  organizations--lending  for  men  or  women,
for  groups  or individuals,  for  cash  crops  or food  crops.  The composite  record
of  the  lending  projects  has  been  disappointing  for  farmers  and  nearly  all  others
concerned.  Particularly  unimpressive  have  been  the  records  of  the  cooperatives,
which  now  dominate  the  rural  credit  picture  with  their  inefficient  yet  now  rather
indispensable  operations,  and  the  commercial  banks,  which  deal  with a'most  no-2-
rural Gambians (see  Wing 1983, Ramamurthy  1986, Clark 1987, Shipton 1987,
Demissie  et  al.  1989).  At  the  macro  as  well  as  micro  levels,  the  country's  debts
are  considerable.  As  of  August,  1988,  financial  analysts  from  Harvard  University
in the  Ministry  of Finance  and  Trade  calculated  that  at the current  rates  of
economic  growth  and  repayments,  it  would  take  until  the  year  2,047  to  pay off,
even if  no new debts  were contracted--which,  of course,  more  will be. 1 Debt
costs  money,  dulls  incentives  to  produce,  and  constrains  political  independence.
The  disappointments  and  debt  spirals  in  Gambian  agriculture  have  been  paralleled
across  Africa  south  of the  Sahara  (see  e.g.  Hyden  1973,  USAID  1973,  Lele  1975,
Shipton  1985).
This  paper  looks, then,  at  the  saving side  of  rural  finance,
internationally  the  more neglected  side.  The simple  question,  "how do rural
Gambians  save?"  has  various  answers,  some  neither  simple  nor  obvious.  Describing
several  indigenous  and other  saving  systems,  starting  with those  closest  to a
rural  home  and  proceeding  outward,  this  paper  shows  farmers  resorting  to both
individually  and  socially  devised  means  of saving,  many  of them  convenient  but
comparatively  costly to them. It  suggests  that the country's development
strategies,  formulated  with  outside  assistance,  have  been  in  imbalance.  Farmers
need  not  just  credit,  but  also  more  and  better  opportuiities  for  savings,  partly
to  reduce  their  dependency  on  borrowing.  A financial  policy  based  on  only  credit
without  savings  is  not  only  ethically  dubious,  but  also  impractical;  it  is like
walking  on  one  leg.
The  existing  saving  habits  of  rural  Gambians  suggest  that  aid  efforts  need
other  kinds  of balance  too.  Farmers  save,  and  must save,  not just  in cash but
also  in  kind.  Whereas  many  economists  in  the  past  have  assumed  small  farmers  to- 3 -
have  a *liquidity  preference',  the  research  suggests  the  opposite--illiqzuidity
preference--to  be  at least  as important.  The  best  mechanisms  for  rural  finance
link  credit  and  savings  together,  and  they  combine  elements  of  individualism  and
collective  respornsibility.  They  take  account  of  both  achievement  incentives  and
social  risks  for savers.  Where farmers  are involved  with financiers,  not just
capital  but  also  information  must  flow  two  ways  between  them  if  rural  people  are
to benefit.
The paper is based mainly on a  field study of farmers' financial
strategies,  using both intensive,  open-ended  interviewing  with a  few key
informants,  and  broader,  structured  surveys,  in  April  and  May  1987  and  from  July
to  October.  1988.  For  the  surveys,  five  villages  were randomly  chosen  in  Upper
River  Division,  MacCarthy  Island  Division,  and  Western  Division  (on  both  sides
of the river). The ethnic  distribution  of informants,  mainly  Mandinka,  Fula
(Peulh),  and  Wollof  speaking  in  that  order  of frequency,  approximated  that  of
The  Gambia  as  a  whole. While  I  lived  and  interviewed  mainly  in  two  villages  with
locally  known,  trusted,  and  trained  research  assistants,  other  such  assistants
surveyed  three  further  villages,  occasionally  visited  briefly  by  me.  138  farmers
were  visited  in  1987;  and  in  1988,  these  were revisited  with  others  added,  for
a total of 167 (counted  after information  discards).  In four of the five
villages,  95  to  100  percent  of  the  compounds  (sometimes  identical  to  dabada  'work
groups',  sometimes  larger)  were  visited  in  the  second  survey.2  One  man  and  one
woman  were interviewed  in  each  compound,  each  several  times. 3
The  ethnic  distribution  of  informants,  mainly  Mandinka-,  Ful_-  (or  Peulh),
and  Wolof-speaking  in  that  order  of frequency,  roughly  approximated  that  of  The
Gambia  as  a  whole. 4 A word  about  ethnic  variation.  The  Gambia  differs  from  some- 4 -
other  parts  of  Africa  south  of the  Sahar&  in that  members  of different  ethno-
linguistic  groups  are  fairly  well  mixed  in the  countryside;  while some  groups
predominate  in  particular  divisions  and  districts  of the  country,  it is  only  at
the village level,  and usually  not even there, that anything  like ethnic
uniformity  may be found.  InterethnJc  c  t.tact  is daily and pervasive.  Some
important  differences  in  economic  thought  and  behavior  remain,  as  briefly  noted
later,  but  one  may  speak  of  general  Gambian  saving  tendencies  in  a  way  that  would
make less  sense  in  many  African  countries. 5
- g and Credit Realistically  Conceived
"Saving,  refers  here to any conservation  of movable property  by an
individual  or group for future  use or disposal.  Usually  most of a family's
savings  will  be  held  in  non-monetary  forms  like  livestock,  grain,  machinery,  or
jewelry;  and  further  wealth  will lie  in obligations  owed  by kin  or neighbors.
Saving, consumption, and  productive investment are  often  not  clearly
distinguishable  on  West  African  farms.  Purchasing  a  draught  animal,  for  instance,
can  mean  all  these  things  simultaneously,  as  can  contributing  labor  or  grain  to
a ceremony  in  which  other  participants  are  potential  part-time  helpers  on  one's
farm.  In a sense,  lending  can  also  be a form  of saving,  and an effective  one,
since  it removes  property  from the constant  demands  of relatives,  neighbors,
friends,  or tax  collectors.
"Credit"  or  a "loan'  shall  refer  here  to  any  transfer  of  goods  or  services
by  one  person  or  group  to  another,  or  to  any  of  its  members,  with  the  expectation
of a compensation  at  _ater  time.  The loan  and  the  compensation  may take  the
same  form  or different  forms.  In The  Gambia,  virtually  everything  is lendable- 5 -
and at times  will be lent.  This includes  nearly  all factors  of agricultural
productions  land, labor,  livestock,  seeds,  fertilizer,  pesticides,  and farm
tools.  Craft  tools,  vehicles,  and  household  goods  are  also lent.
"Credit"  to  anglophones  has  a  cleaner  ring  than  3uloo  to  Mandinka-speakers.
Its connotations  are positives  confidence,  trust (it comes from the Latin
credere,  to believe  or entrust),  and  helpfulness.  This is perhaps  one of the
reasons  why  credit  is  such  a common  term  in  development  plans,  and  why  planning
committee  recommendations  so  often  seem  to  boil  down  to  credit. But  credit,  of
course,  is only another  way of saying  debt.  Credit  is debt: it matters  only
whether  one  is the  borrower  or the  lender,  and  whether  one  is speaking  before
or  after  the  loan.  If "credit"  is  replaced  with "debt"  wherever  the  word  appears
in  project  documents,  these  begin  to  look  rather  different:  "The  main  impediment
to farming  is lack  of dabt"...  "  In project  year one, 2,500  farmers  will be
issued  debt..."  Juloo  contains  something  of this  disturbing  truth,  something  of
a  warning.
Just  as  there  is  no  credit  without  debt.  there  is  none  without  patronage.
At all  levels,  international,  national,  and  local,  cheap  loans  can  be a  way of
securing  supporters,  clients,  or voters:  credit  can  be as much a political  as
an economic  device.  Yet the stock language  of international  lending  agency
conversations  and  reports  carries  subtle  but  clear  assumptions  of  condescension.
Lenders  are  misidentified  as "donors".  Borrowers  are  called  not borrowers  but
"loanees"  (or  "target  groups"),  as  though  merely  passive  recipients  of  something
grandly  provided.  The  reports  tell  of "supervising"  borrowers,  and  of  needs  for
"discipline",  as  though  the  borrowers  were  not  quite  adult. "Moral  hazard"  seems
to refer  always  to  the "loanees',  never  to the  lenders  themselves.- 6 -
Cultural  differences  between  international  lenders  and  borrowers  in The
Gambia make their partnerships  hard to manage. Assumptions  about interest
charges,  for instance,  differ  profoundly  between  northern  and West African
peoples.  Whereas  the  former  conventionally  distinguish  fair  lending  from  usury
in  terms  of "interest  rates"  (i.e.,  increments  per  unit  of  time),  the  latter  tend
to draw  the  distinctions  more in  terms  of interest  ratios  (i.e,  of interest  to
principal,  as the  amounts  are  finally  paid),  the amount  of time  elapsed  tieing
less  important.  Differences  between  Judeo-Christian,  Islamic,  and  local  religious
understandings  about  interest  multiply  the  misunderstandings. 6
In superficial  survey  interviews,  farmers  anywhere  often  say they  want
credit;  they do so knowing  that  aid agencies  prefer  loans  to other  kinds of
intervention,  and that  there  will always  be a chance  of debt forgiveness.  But
needs  and  expressed  wants  are  not  necessarily  the  same,  and  credit  always  seems
more  useful  to  the  borrower  before  a loan,  when it  is  still  "credit",  than  after
it,  when it is  debt.  Real  behavior  also  gives  the  lie  to  credit  clamor.  In  The
Gambia,  poorer  farmers  tend  to  borrow  more  often,  and  on  worse  terms,  than  richer
ones. Farmers  tend to borrow  more after  bad harvests  than after good ones,
evidence  that  they  prefer  at  some  level  to  minimize  their  seasonal  indebtedness.
Farmers  unassisted  by governments,  cooperatives,  or banks are neither
without  credit  (as  some reports  would  have it)  nor entirely  at the  mercy of
"moneylenders"  (as  others  would  have  it).  Many  and  varied  loans  occu;  within  and
between  villages,  including,  for  instance,  seasonal  crop  loans,  share  contracting
arrangements,  delayed  marriage  payments,  contributions  for  schooling  or labf
migrations  with remittances  expected  later  in return,  and seed capital  loans
between  small  entrepreneurs  (see  Shipton  1987,  1990a,b).  Some loans  last  orly-7-
hours,  others  up to several  generations. Gamb4;n  f&rmers  live in a credit
economy,  and  most  are  perpetually  involved  in  a  complex  web  of  debts  and  credits
to relatives,  neighbors,  friends,  and  merchants.
Anyone involved  in lending  co smallholding  farmers  should  understand,
then,  that  farmers  have their  own  personal  hierarchies  of creditors,  and  that
the  newest,  most distant,  and  least  familiar  lenders  rank  at the  bottom.  (And
seen from  a 'target  grotup",  even  big guns,  when far  enough  away,  become  very
small.)  This understanding  puts into perspective  pejorative  judgments  about
*moral  hazards'  and "delinquencyw  where  farmers  fall  into  arrears  or  default  on
institutional  loans.
Other  Basic  Principles
West  African  farmers  are  usually  not just farmers.  Multiple  occupations
(sometimes  intermittent  and  often missed in  questionnaire  surveys) cut
subsistence  risks,  even  out income  through  the year,  and put family  labor  to
beneficial  use.  Real  rural  people  do  not  live  in 'sectors",  and  these  notions,
as  embodied for  instance in  the  divisions between corridors of  large
international  aid  agencies,  are  not  as real  or important  to  Gambian  farmers  as
to some development  planners from northern countries.  Saved and borrowed
resources  are  exchangeable  and  substitutable  (to  economists,  "fungible")  between
agriculture,  for instance,  and housing,  trade,  health,  or education,  in ways
lenders  cannot  easily  control  and should  probably  not attempt  to control.
The  social  divicions  common  to the  several  larbest  Gambian  (and  southern
Senegalese)  ethnic  groups  include  not just nucle-ted  villages  with elected
headmen,  but  also  patrilineages  and  divisions  into  cross-cutting  castes,  classes,- 8 -
age-grades,  Islamic  worship  groups,  and  voluntary  associations. 7 These  give  each
individual  multiple  economic  resources  and  obligations  within  a  village,  and  some
outside.
There  is  no single  social  unit  of  analysis  like  'the  household"  to  consider
within  villages,  but  a nested  hierarchy  of decision  fields,  including  village
wards  (where  they  exist),  lineages compounds,  work  groups,  and  cooking  groups.
Decisions  about  family  resource  allocation  ate  often  not  made unilaterally  by
"family  heads";  in  The  Gambia,  as elsewhere  in  Africa  south  of the  Sahara,  men
and women often  make their  financial  decisions  separately,  or negotiate  and
compete  about  joint  savings  or investments. 8
Seasonal  and  Longer-term  Fluctuations
Rural  financial  systems  in  The  Gambia  can  only  be understood  in  terms  of
their  seasonal  nature.  The  single  rainfed  agricultural  season  produces  an  annual
spurt of wealth, trade,  and other economic  activity  nationwide  from about
December  to  March,  following  the  harvest  of  groundnuts  and  the  other  main  crops.
Moct loans  of agricultural  inputs  will be sought  around  June,  at the  onset  of
the  rains;  food  is  commonly  borrowed  as  needed  between  then  and  the  harvest  of
the  first  crops (in  some  areas,  early  millet  in September),  though  it  may be
borrowed  at any time  for  ceremonies  or other  special  needs.  It is at harvest
time  that  farmers  will  make  most  of the  loan  repayments  they  make.
Some  rotating  saving  and  credit  associations  (or  "ROSCAS",  locally  called
osusu  groups,  and in French,  tontines)  among  farmers  suspend  their  operations
during the rainy season,  when cash for contributions  becomes scarce, and
re-commence  in  the  trade  season.  In rural  bank  branches,  lending  may similarly- 9  -
fall  off  during  the  year  as  money  for  lending  becomes  scarce.  The  seasonal  nature
of  credit  in  the  Gambia  strongly  influences  local  thought  about  interest  rates
(Shipton  1990a).
II.  RURAL  SAVING  WITHOUT  MONEYt
STORAGE  CYCLES  AND  THE  GENDER  WALLS  OF PROPERTY
The  first  and  most  basic  point  about  savings  in  The  Gambia  is  that  most
of  it  does  not  take  the  form  of  money.  Its  most  important  material  forms  include
livestock,  food,  jewelry,  tools,  and  household  goods. Some  but  not  all  of  these
kinds  of savings  can  be directly  influenced  by  projects  and  programs.
Livestock
Livestock  are the  most important  form  of movable  property  saved  in The
Gambia.  Nearly  every  rural  family  keeps  some  small  or large  stock. 9 Men  claim
most  of the  cattle,  and  nearly  all  the  donkeys  and  horses;  the  sheep  and  goats
are  at  least  as  commonly  owned  by  women  as by  men.  Like  most  other  Africans  who
possess  livestock,  Gambians  seek to convert  g£ain  to small  stock,  and small
stock to large stock (while  still  keeping at least  a few small stock for
diversity  and  liquidity).  Large  stock,  in  turn,  can  be  useful  to  men  for  marriage
and  other  ceremonies,  and  thus  for  obtaining  a  larger  labor  force  to  produce  more
grain. 10 Men value large  stock  as a form of savings  partly  because it is
indivisible  and  thus  more  or  less  removed  from  the  day-to-day  claims  their  wives-
-this  is  what  I  shall  call  the  "gender  wall  of  property"--and  other  kin.  Few  who
can  afford  to  convert  some  of their  small  stock  to large  stock  will fail  to do- 10  -
so.11 It is  only  in  cases  of  hardship  or special  ceremonial  needs  that  Gambian
farmers  are  likely  to sell  or slaughter  cattle.
Though  it  shelters  wealth  from  daily  demands  of  kin,  livestock  is  none  the
less  subject  to  some  special  family  claims  limiting  its  use.  Stock  inherited  by
a group of siblings  cannot  be disposed  of by any individual  for his own
self-enrichment  without  the  consent  of the  others,  because  it is  believed  that
this  would  produce  'bad  money":  money  which  will  ultimately  be  wasted  or  bring
a tragedy  to the  one  who sold  the  family  property.12 In traditional  Gambian
religions  it  is spirits  who  are  thought  to  control  the  outcome  of  these  events;
to  fully  converted  Muslims  it  is  Allah.  Today  many  Gambians  question  the  popular
beliefs  about  alienating  family  wealth,  but  most  prefer  to  stay  on  the  safe  side.
It  is  common  practice  to  lend  cattle  out  to  relatives  or  friends  for  months
or  even  years.  This  is  done  for  several  reasons.  One  is  to  provide  needy  kin  with
milk  or  manure.  Another  may  be to  reduce  pressure  on grazing  lands  around  one's
own  village.  A third  is to  conceal  one's  wealth  from  tax-collectors,  neighbors,
or  others.  A fourth  is  to  minimize  risks  of losing  one's  entir-  herd  through  an
epizootic  disease  or a theft.  Because  herds  of different  owners  are usually
mixed,  and  because  it  is  considered  impolite  to  ask  how  many  cattle  a  farmer  has,
it  is extremely  difficult  to assess  wealth  in  livestock.
Farmers  give  several  reasons  for  preferring  to  save  their  wealth  in  stock,
in  addition  to  the  subtler  considerations  of gender  noted  above.  These  include
the  fact  that  animals  breed,  the  advantages  of  milk  and  manure  production,  the
usefulness  of animal  traction,  the ceremonial  values  of animals,  the status
value,  and the  satisfactions  in  having  herds  to  watch.  Ecologically,  however,
an unlimited  accumulation  of livestock  may be hazardous  in its soil erosion- 11  -
effects,  particularly  as the  human  population  and  cultivation  pressure  on land
also  grow,  and  this  is probably  a good  reason  for  making  other  saving  options
easier.
Propensities  to  invest  in  livestock,  like  propensities  to save  cash,  seem
to  vary from  one  ethnic  group  to another.  In the  Gambia  the  Fula  and  Jola  have
acquired  reputations  as  avid  cattle-keepers.  But  all  rural  Gambians  would  rather
convert  other  property  to livestock  than  convert  livestock  to other  property.
Therefore  project  planners  should  not  consider  cattle  as  a  store  of  freely  usable
wealth, expendable  for agricultural  inputs  like fertilizer  or able to be
liquidated  for  community  projects.
Jewelry
If  cattle  are  a  characteristically  male  preserve  of  wealth,  gold  and  silver
jewelry  are  a female  preserve,  a shelter  from  the  daily  demands  of  husbands  and
others.  Most important  are  earrings. 13 Those  provided  to a young  woman  by the
time  of  marriage  commonly  cost  1,000  dalasis  or  more.  The  ornaments  may  grow  in
size  as a woman ages;  gold can be added  by a smith  as a woman acquires  new
wealth.  Like livestock,  jewelry  is something  rural  Gambians  will  not  part  with
easily,  but  it  constitutes  a useful  store  of  wealth  for  times  of crisis.  In the
occasional  uncommon  instances  where  collateral  is  demanded  for  loans  by traders
or distant  acquaintances,  it can  take  the form  of jewelry. 14 In an emergency,
and  only  then,  husbands  may  ask  wives  to  pawn their  earrings.  Gender  walls  of
property  are  not  wholly  impermeable.- 12 -
Stored  Crops
A substantial  part  of  the  wealth  of  each  family  (or  work  group)  is  its  stored
crops.  Stored  food  usually  falls  under  the  control  of  one  member  of the  family,
though  other  members  may  complain  if  they  think  it is  misused.  Mien  are  usually
expected  to store  coarse  grains  (millets,  sorghum,  and  maize)  for  family  food;
women  who  grow  rice  store  much  of it  too  for  family  consumption.  Though  both  men
and  women  now  grow  groundnuts  (the  main cash  crop)  in  most  of The  Gambia,  they
are  expected  to use some  of it in different  ways.  Women  are  expected  to store
a  substantial  part  of their  groundnut  crops  for  family  food;  men  are  not.  Men,
however,  are  expected  to  store  and  provide  seed  for  the  family,  while  women  are
not. On balance,  this means that women store greater  proportions  of their
groundnuts  for  family  use  than  men  do,  and  that  men  sell  greater  proportions  than
women.15
Gambian  farmers  who  sell  food  crops  tend  to  do so  just  after  harvest.  They
recognize  that  withholding  crop  sales  until  later  in  the  year,  when  food  becomes
scarce  and  prices  rise,  can  yield  them  more cash.  But  few  feel  they  can  afford
to  wait.  One reason  is that  losses  in storage  can  be considerable.  Another  is
that  the  demands  of  needy  relatives  become  stronger  in  the "hungry  season",  and
saving  one's crops then for sale may appear  anti-social:  while maximizing
short-term  profits,  one risks  losing  a social  support  network  that  may have
longer-term  economic  value.  A few  who can  afford  to  withhold  or buy crops  at
harvest  time,  and  are  willing  to risk  some  social  disfavor  for  doing  so,  serve
as a kind of "food  pawnbrokers"  for  other  farmers,  selling  them  back similar
foods  later  in the  season  at  higher  prices.- 13 -
Some  villages  have  central  seed  storehouses  that  members  of  all  compounds
may  use  for  groundnuts,  coarse  grains,  and  other  seed.  In  these,  however,  sacks
or  bundles  of seeds  are  usually  individualized  and  may  be labelled.  The  stores
are  often  kept locked,  and  two  or  more  keyholders  may  be required  to open  them.
An advantage  of this form of storage is the economy of scale in strong
construction. 16 A cement  house  with an iron  roof,  beyond  the  means of many
individual  farmers,  cuts  down  rodent  damage.  Centralization  also  makes  treatment
with storage  pesticides  easy and inexpensive.  Another  advantage  is that the
system  adds  disincentives  to  consume  one's  seed  before  planting,  since  doing  so
requires  arrangement  with  the  keyholder(s).  A disadvantage  is  that  farmers  must
let  others  know  how  much  they  possess,  something  they  usually  try  not to  do in
the  case  of personal  or family  stores.
Storage  Facility  Projects
Village  seed  stores  appear  to  have  been  an effective  form  of development
intervention  by  various  governmental  and  non-governmental  agencies  (most  notably
the  Freedom  from  Hunger  Campaign).  Although  there  have  been  several  projects  for
building  and  managing  seed  stores,  many  villages  remain  without  these. People
in  these  villages  are  clamoring  to  get  them. Gambian  farmers  are  losing  their
own resources  to rodents,  birds,  smaller  pests,  and  molds  while they  continue
to accrue  new and  expensive  debts  for food  and seed.  This unfortunate  cycle
should  be broken.
No one  appears  to  have  comprehensive  knowledge  of  what  storage  facilities
exist  in the  Gambian  countryside--a  nationwide  survey  would  be  welcome--but  it- 14 -
is clear that there  are many villages  with no central  seed stores  or cereal
banks,  and  almost  none  with special  storage  facilities  for  women.
Crop  and  seed  storage  facilities  should  be  created  and  maintained  not  just
for  cash  crops,  but  also  for  food  crops. They  should  be  created  and  maintained
not  just  for  men's  crops,  but  also  for  women's.  Hitherto,  emphasis  in  seed  store
construction  has  been  placed  on  groundnuts.  Storage  facilities  are  also  needed
for  rice--a  crop  highly  vulnerable  to  rodents  and  other  pests--and  perhaps  coarse
grains.  Seed  and  crop  stores,  once  constructed,  take  relatively  little  monitoring
and  follow-up.  This  is  a great  advantage  of  this  kind  of "savings'  scheme  over
credit  schemes.
Gambian  women  are  accustomed  to  storing  rice  and  coarse  grains  individually
in  their  houses  or grain  stores,  for  good  social  reasons. One is  that  they  do
not wish other families  to know exactly  how much they possess  at any time.
Probably  few  would  be  willing  to  put  all  their  crops  in  central  village  stores.
Attempts  should  be made to  help them  improve  their  family  stores  --these  seem
in many places  to have deteriorated  over recent  decades--as  well as to help
establish  more  village  stores.  The  approach  should  be experimental  at first.
Gambian  women  are  not  widely  accustomed  to storing  their  crops  in sacks.
Sacks  will need to  be made  more easily  accessible  to  women if  village  storage
facilities  are  created  for  them.  It should  be expected  that  some  or even  most
sacks  will be used for other  purposes,  like bedding:  this is one of those
"intersectoral  leakages",  infuriating  to  project  managers  but  perfectly  natural
to  farmers.
"Cereal  banks"  have been  another  approach  tried  in recent  years.  These
have  differed  from  seed  stores  in that  they tend  to be larger-scale,  designed- 15 -
not for single  villages  but for  clusters  of several  or many,  and  in that  they
have included  finances  resources  for  buying  and selling  crops.  The  buildings
constructed  seem  to  have  been  more  successful  than  the  cash  components  of  these
projects,  which  seem  to  have suffered  from  the  same  kinds  of graft  problems  as
co-operatives  and  have  soon  collapsed.  A problem,  just  as in  the  co-operatives,
seems  to have been the  absence  of a feeling  of shared  responsibility  between
members  of  different,  ostensibly  cooperating  villages.  Generally,  basing  storage
facilities  on the  village  unit  has proved  more successful  than  basing  them on
larger  aggregates.
Linkages  between  Credit  and  Storage
Evidence  from  1988  shows  that  farmers  are  willing  and  able  to  store  higher
proportions  of their  own  groundnut  seeds  when  warned  that  they  will  not  receive
them on credit from the co-operatives.  They store  more for their "strange
farmers (seasonal  land  clients)  as  well  as  for  themselves.  There  are  two  policy
implications.  One  is  that  the  government  and  co-operatives  should  inform  farmers
early  in the  trade  season  about  credit  availability  for  the  following  season.
The  other  is that  when co-operative  groundnut  seed  credit  diminishes,  storage
facilities  for  other  crops  become  more  necessary,  since  farmers'  storing  more
groundnuts  squeezes  other  crops  out  of the  stores.
In 1988,  even  after  three  consecutive  good  harvests,  most  of  the  informal
borrowing  of money was still  for food,  mainly  rice.  Cultural  and religious
pressures  favor credit  for immediate  consumption  over credit  for immediate
production. But  the  truth  is  not as simple  as this. Most informal  borrowing
of  money  and  food  occurs  during  the  rains. This  is  when  hunger,  weakness,  and- 16 -
malarial  disease  coincide  with the  peak labor  season,  and  when  most crops  need
weeding and rice needs transplanting.  So credit for food is also  a kind of
indirect  production  credit. Because  labor  is about  the scarcest  resource  in
Gambian  farming,  this function  is  not to be underestimated.  Those  who cannot
consume  cannot  produce.
Other  Household  and  Farm  Goods
In the  brief  period  of relative  solvency  after  harvests,  rural  Gambians
often  buy  hard  goods  that  they  will  use  and  later  re-sell,  whether  the  re-selling
was  part  of  their  original  plan  or  not.  These  durable  goods  are  an  important  form
of savings.  They  may include  electronic  goods  like radios  or tape recorders,
"luxuries'  like  fancy  beds;  vehicles  like  bicycles  or  carts;  or food  processing
machines  like  peanut-butter  grinders.  (In the cities  and larger  towns,  fine
clothing  is also  used  and re-sold  frequently.)  The intimacy  of social  life in
a Gambian  village  ensures  good communications  between  buyers  and sellers  of
these  used  goods.
III.  SAVING IN CASH:
ILLIQUIDITY  PREFERENCE  AND  THE  SQUAWK  FACTOR
Cash  in  rural  Africa  is  an  odd  commodity  surrounded  by  ambivalent  attitudes
(Shipton  1989).  Nothing  in The Gambia  is more sought  after  than money,  but
nothing  is  more  quickly  disposed  of.  Indeed,  money  is  even  seen  as something  to
get rid  of, something  to convert  into longer  lasting  forms.  Several  features
make money an unstable  form of wealth in The Gambia: its nearly  universal
fungibility,  its  divisibility,  and its  portability.  These  features  make money- 17 -
contestable.  Everyone  needs  it for scAiething,  particularly  in the lean  season
from  June to August;  and one  with money  will usually  have an almost  infinite
number  of relatives  or neighbors  with  pressing  needs.  Inflation,  of course,  is
a further  reason  not  to hold  onto  money.  Though  few  farmers  have the  means  to
measure  inflation,  nearly  all  are  aware  of the  process. Rural  Gambian  saving
strategies,  then,  are  largely  concerned  with removing  wealth  from  the  form  of
readily  accessible  cash,  without  appearing  anti-social.  In  communities  where  one
has  many  relatives,  as is  usual,  this  is  a delicate  balancing  act,  and  besides
any  ethical  issues  involved,  the "squawk  factor",  the  potential  for  complaints
and  accusations,  must enter  every  individual  savings  decision.
Nonetheless,  individuals  do keep  some cash reserves (in Mandinka,
fangkanto;  in  Fula  and  Wolof,  fangkanta).  Much  of the  cash  that  rural  Gambians
keep,  they  keep  at  home;  and  when  asked  how  they  preferred  to  save  money,  nearly
half  said  they  preferred  to  keep  it  for  themselves. 17 About  25  percent  said  they
preferred  to  use  banks--far  more  than  had  actually  used  them,  suggesting  problems
of access.  Other  ways  of saving  mentioned  included  entrusting  money  to another
individual,  post office  savings,  burial,  and mother'  means including  savings
9clubs  (see  Table  1).
We  review  below  some  of  the  various  ways  of  saving  cash.  Perhaps  the  oldest
way  of removing  money  from  the  public  eye,  in  The  Gam.bia  as in  some  other  parts
of  Africa,  is  literally  to bury  it,  in an  earthen  pot,  bottle,  or box. 18 This
old  practice  is  disappearing,  no one  is  proud  to  use  the  method--only  2  percent
of the  men and  none  of the  women  named  burial  as their  preferred  way to save.
Metal  locks,  now  available  in every  Gambian  market  town,  have  made burial  seem
less  necessary.  The  main  advantage  left  in  burying  one's  wealth  is  the  safeguard- 18 -
against  house-burning.  In those  villages  where  farmers  have  gradually  replaced
thatch  with  metal  roofing,  this  function  too  is  being  obviated.
Most  cash  savings  in  the  farming  communities  today  are  kept  well  concealed,
usually  together  with  clothes,  jewelry,  or  other  valued  possessions,  in  a  locked
box or trunk,  under  or beside  the  owner's  bed or sleeping  platform.  Locking
customs  deserve  some  attention;  they  differ  from  what  foreign  visitors  sometimes
expect.  Most  Gambian  houses  constructed  as  permanent  dwellings  now  have  lockable
fixtures  on  their  exterior  doors,  but  just  about  anyone  who  can  afford  to  do so
keeps  a lockable  box  within.  When asked  about  why they lock  the  boxes inside
their  horses  too,  Gambians  often  speak  of  their  spouses.  Where  cash  is  concerned,
many marriages  include  very little  free  and easy sharing,  nor is it usually
expected  that spouses  will share  knowled3e  of how much cash they possess.
Bluffing  s.nd  negotiation  are routine  and  well-understood.  Rural Gambians  are
sometimes  surprised  to  hear  how,  in  the  United  States  (lately  such  a  world  beacon
of individualism  on the  radio),  spouses  often  leave  cash  in  bedroom  drawers  or
handbags  hung in pantries,  known  and accessible  to each other,  and how many
indeed  lock nothing  away from each other  within their  houses. 19 To rural
Gambians  such  habits  can  seem  like  rather  unnatural  family  communism.
But  owners  must  protect  their  cash  from  themselves  as  well as from  their
kin  and  neighbors.  Hence  the  custom  of  the  box  called  "kondem"  (from  the  English
"condemn*)  or ukondanehZ  (from  the French,  condamnee)  in local languages,
resembling  in  a  western  "piggy  bank"  in  function.  The  farmer  engages  a  carpenter
to build  a box (usually  costing  about  5 dalasis)  that  must be broken  to be
opened,  with a  small  slot  for  inserting  money.  Both  younger  and  older  adults  of
both  sexes  do  this.  (Kondem  boxes  are  common  not  just  in  the  countryside  but  also- 19  -
in  the  citios,  where  they  are  likely  to  be  made  with  plywood  boards.)  The  boxes,
like old burial  pots, are evidence  of something  contrary  to the 'liquidity
preference"  that  foreigners  sometimes  assume.  Just  as important,  or  more,  is  an
"illiquidity  preference".
Rural  Deposit-Takers
Another  widely-used  strategy  is the  money-keeper. 20 Some rural  Gambians
give  money  to others  in their  villages  to  hold for  them.  They  may choose  any
trusted  person--there  are  no  specialized  deposit-takers--but  often  the  depositor
will  choose  a  relative  or  other  person  who  is  likely  to  have  other  cash  available
for  his or  her  own  urgent  needs.
In the 1988 survey,  46 percent  of the  women and  20 percent  of the men
respondents  had  entrusted  money  to  other  individuals  in 1987  and  1988.21 More
had  given  deposits  than  taken  them:  in the  same  period,  16 percent  of  men and
15 percent of the women respondents  had received  deposits  from others.  An
individual  may  hold  money  for  several  people  simultaneously,  as these  figures
suggest;  and  more  occasionally,  an  individual  deposits  with  more  than  one  keeper
at  a  time.  The  great  majority  of  depositors  of  both  sexes  had  made  their  deposits
in January  and  February,  in the season  of groundnut  harvesting  and  marketing,
and  more  than  half  said  they  had  made  only  one  deposit  in  a  year.  63  percent  had
withdrawn  their  deposits  in Hay and June, reflecting  tne importance  of land
preparation  and planting expenses  as a  purpose of saving. Otherwise the
withdrawals  were spread  about evenly  through  the year. Only rarely  does an
individual  leave  money  in  deposit  with  another  for  more than  a year.- 20 -
Who  were the  money-keepers?  Mostly  they  were people  from  families  like
those of their depositors,  but often rather  better-off.  73 percent of the
depositors  identified  their  money-keepers  as mainly  farmers  by occupation.  13
percent  named  shopkeepers  or traders,  4  percent  named  government  employees,  and
10 percent  named others.  71 percent  of the depositors  (80  percent  of the
depositing  men  and  64  percent  of the  depositing  women)  left  the  money  with  men.
So, while roughly  equal proportions  of men and women take appear to take
deposits,  more  people  entrust  their  money  to  the  men than  the  women.  A village
headman (alkalo)  or other local notable sometimes  holds several  deposits
simultaneously.
Why the bias toward  men is unclear.  It may be because  men are more
respected  and  feared,  and  considered  more likely  to  pursue  or punish  a thief.
Money-keepers  may sense  that  men's  higher  prestige  gives  them  more to lose if
they should fail to refund  the savings.  (These  are also reasons  why some
depositors  choose  village  headmen.)  Men are likely  to have had more formal
schooling  than  women,  and to be more comfortable  doing  arithmetic  with large
numbers.  It  may  be  that,  having  more  cash  on  average  than  women,  men  are  locally
deemed  less  likely  to  dip  into  the  cash.  Perhaps  men,  generally  often  have  more
"blood  kin"  in their  respective  villages  than  women,  are  expected  to  have  more
alternate  cash  sources  for  their  own  emergencies  (though  they  also  have  greater
cash  obligations).  Perhaps,  for  reasons  of pride,  men simply  did  not  wish to
admit  saving  with  women  as  much  as  women  did  with  men.
Money  keeping  is  very local.  79  percent  of the  depositors  named  as their
money-keepers  other members of their respective  villages, reflecting  the
importance  of  both  residential  nearness  and  kinship--since  these  often  coincide-- 21 -
-in  determining  trust  or  confidence.  To isolate  the  role  of  kinship,  69  percent
specified  known relatives  as their  money-keepers,  and 45 percent  named their
parents,  spouses,  full siblings,  or offspring.  79 percent  of women  depositors
used  kin  as  their  safe-keepers,  as  against  only  55  percent  of depositors.  Among
the women depositors,  36 percent  named their  husbands  as the  money-keepers,
whereas  among the  men depositors,  only 5 percent  named their  wives, raising
interesting  questions  about  who trusts  whom with  money  in  marriages. Only 24
percent  of the  male and female  depositors  identified  their  respective  money-
keepers  to be unrelated  friends.  Note,  however,  that the sample  sizes  behind
these  figures  are small  (see  Table  2).
Gambians  prefer  to  entrust  their  money  to  their  elders.  Thus  they  use  their
parents  but  not  their  offspring  as  money-keepers.  That  women  entrust  their  money
to their  husbands  more than  men to their  wives (Table  3) fits  the  age  pattern
too,  since  most  husbands  are  older  than  their  wives,  some  by  many years.
How  big  are  the  amounts  involved? Irn  the  1987  survey  they  varied  from  20
dalasis--the  lowest  reported,  at any rate--to  over 2,000,  the  median  deposit
being  about  251 dalasis.  Though  women  are  more likely  to deposit  with money-
keepers  than  men,  the  men  deposit  bigger  sums.  In  their  last  visits  with  money-
keepers  before  being  interviewed  in  1988,  depositing  men  had  left  a  median  sum
of 530  dalasis  for  safe  keeping,  as compared  with the  depositing  women's  median
of  150  dalasis.  And  26  percent  of  the  men  depositors,  as  against  only  10  percent
of the  women  ones,  reported  having  entrusted  amounts  of 1,000  or  more.- 22 -
Terms,  Risks,  and  Incentives  in  Informal  Money-Keeping
Interest payments or  service charges are  unheard of  in  village
money-keeping,  and the  depositor  often  expects  to receive  back the same  notes
or coins  lent.  It is  generally  agreed  that  the  money-keeper  should  not  use  the
money  deposited,  but it is  not so  clear  who  holds  the  legal  right  to the  money
during  the  period  of the  deposit.  A Basse  court  record  describes  a civil  case
in  which  a shepherd  entrusted  80 dalasis  to  a shopkeeper  for  safe  keeping,  and
the  shop's  cash  was later  stolen  by thieves. The  shepherd  sought  the  full  80
dalasis. The  court  ruled  that  the  shopkeeper  owed  the  shepherd  40  dalasis,  half
the  amount  deposited. Villagers  interviewed  disagreed  among  themselves  about
the  correctness  of the  decision.
If  moneykeeping  can  entail  some  financial  risk  to  the  moneykeeper,  why  does
he or she agree to perform  the service?  The obvious  and ostensible  reasons
include helping the  saver, cementing a  social bond,  and  demonstrating
trustworthiness  to the community  by eventual  word of mouth.  Another  possible
reason  is  that  the  cash,  though  normally  expected  not  to  be  used,  none he less
gives  the  money-keeper  a  reserve  available  for  family  emergencies:  if  need  arose
to  taxi  a  snakebitten  child  to  the  hospital  or  to  pay  a  son's  court  bail  at  short
notice,  cash  would be on hand.  Since  the  money  belongs  to someone  else,  this
emergency  reserve  is  easier  to  defend  from  the  daily  requests  of spouses,  other
kin,  or neighbors  than  money  of one's  own.
A bigger  question  is  why the  depositor  chooses  the  money-keeper  system,
rather  than  one  that  might  pay  interest,  as  with a bank.  Islamic  prohibitions
against  interest,  discussed  more  fully  elsewhere  (Shipton  1990a),  are  only  part
of  an  answer,  since  local  loans  with  interest  are  countenanced  in  practice.  When- 23 -
asked  what  they  liked  most  about  the  money-keeper  system,  farmers  tended  to  talk
of trustworthiness  and safety  more than  of proximity  or convenience. 22 Since
most  deposit-taking  goes  on  within  villages  and  among  kin, those  who save  this
way  are  displaying  trust  not  Just  in  the  individuals  to  whom they  are  confiding
their  savings,  but also  in the  networks  and  groups  to  which  both they  and the
keepers  belong:  the  mechanisms  to  which  they  would  turn  for support  as a last
resort  if  keepers  refused  to return  the  money.
An implication  for banks  in the  western  Sahel  is that if they  wish to
attract  more customers,  they  may  need  more and  better  public  relations  in the
honest  sense  of  the  term--not  just  better  interest  rates  or  accessibility,  though
these  would  probably  interest  customers  in  their  services.  It  may  help  to  recruit
some  elders  where  literacy  or other  qualifications  permit,  since  local  practice
suggests  they  are  more trusted  than  juniors. 23
But  banks  and  other  formal  institutions  should  expect  only  to supplement
rather  than  supplant  the  local  money-keeping  system,  since  the  latter  has  devoted
practitioners.  In  the  1988  survey,  for  instance,  informants  who  used  the  services
of "informal"  money-keepers  were  asked  whether  they  were  content  with  this  system
of saving.  94Z  replied  yes.  Conversely,  when asked  if there  were any  problems
with it,  98Z  replied  no. 24 A bank  might  envy  such  user confidence.
Deferred  Wages
Wage-earners  have a related  way of saving,  which is to ask  employers  to
withhold  wages over short  times to let them accumulate.  (This  is a system
familiar  to researchers  hiring  local  research  assistants.  While  some  assistants
in the city or countryside  constantly  request  advances,  others  ask to defer- 24 -
payments  for  months  at  a  time.)  Some  agricultural  wage  laborers  prefer  to  be  paid
only  quarterly,  and  a  recent  study  of  Gambian  share  contracting  in  farming  found
that most workers prefer arrangements  in which they receive their main
compensation  seasonally  rather  than  at shorter  intervals  (Robertson  1987:  221).
As in the village  money-keeping  customs  described  above,  individuals  entrust
their  money  to  others  who they  know  are  more  solvent  than  they  are,  and  who  have
something  to lose  in reputations  in  the  case  of failure  to repay.
Amounts  Commonly  Saved
It  is  nearly  impossible  to  determine  the  amounts  of  farmers'  personal  cash
savings.  Indirect  questioning  in  the  villages  suggested  that  most  farmers'  liquid
cash  savings  could  be  counted  in the  hundreds  of  dalasis  (sometimes  held  partly
in francs  CFA) at any  given  point  during  the "trade  season"  from  December  to
March,  a  few  farmers'  rising  into  the  thousands;  but  that  most  have  cash  savingc
of  less  than  100  dalasis  at  any  given  time  uring  the  rest  of  the  year.  Men  appear
generally  to  have  larger  sums  at  their  disposal  than  women  have  during  the  trade
season,  but  women  seem  usually  to save  more  than  men,  as a proportion  of their
wealth  and  perhaps  also  in absolute  sums,  in the lean  season.  Thus  men's  cash
savings  seem  to  fluctuate  more  than  women's.  One  reason  for  this  may  be  women's
considerable  involvement  in non-farming  economic  activities  outside  the crop
season,  when  many  men  are  idle.  A second  may  be  that  since  men  usually  do their
land  preparation  before  women  do,  and  may  pre-empt  the  use  of  animal-drawn  tools
for their  own fields,  women often  expect  to have to hire labor  in preparing
their  own.  There  are indications  that  elders  tend to save  more in cash than
juniors.- 25 -
Interviews  indicated  that  most cash savings  over about  100 dalasis  for
periods  longer  than  a few  weeks  are  made for specific  target  expenditures. 25
People  with thousands  of  dalasis  in  savings  will  usually  be those  with upcoming
ceremonies  like  weddings  to finance,  or young  men planning  to travel  to find
work.  Savingt  in  these  cases  will  usually  include  earmarked  rontributions  from
kin.
Gambians  may  vary  somewhat  by  ethnic  group  in  saving  habits.  It  is  thought
that  some  Serahuli  and  others  engaged  in  trade  as  well  as  agriculture  keep  larger
stocks  of  cash  in  their  houses  than  other  rural  Gambians  (though  stereotypes  may
exaggerate  these  tendencies).  They  may use heavier  boxes  or even chained  or
cement-anchored  safes.  Mauritanian  and  other  merchants  tend  to  do  the  same.  Many
merchants,  however,  appear  to re-invest  cash  quickly  in  merchandise  rather  than
saving  large  amounts.  Small  shopkeepers  commonly  deposit  cash  savings  with  larger
traders  in  their  villages  or in larger  towns.
IV.  LOCAL  MECHANISMS  COMBINING  SAVINGS  AND CREDIT
Kafo  Groups:  Village  Women's  and  Men's  Associations
Normally  every  Gambian  village  has  one  or  more  groups  known  known  as  kafo
(or  kafoo)  in Mandinka  and some other  Gambian  languages. 26 Though  the term
referred  in the  past to  men's  or  women's  age-grade  organizations,  and  usually
still  does,  it can refer  more  generically  to various  kinds  of interest  groups
in  a  village. 27 Today  they  may  be organized  around  a specific  activity  like  a
sport  or  dancing,  or loyalty  to  a  political  party;  and  they  often  ha%e  multiple
functions.- 26 -
Membership  in kafo groups  is voluntary,  but commonly  it includes  most
persons  of the  eligible  gender  and  age  range  in a  village.  As few  as under  10
or,  in  a  sizeable  town,  as  many  as  over  300  members  may  belong. 28 Nearly  always,
in  a  village,  women's  associations  have  a  more  comprehensive  coverage  than  men's.
Occasionally  an  individual  can  belong  to  kafo  groups  in  more  than  one  village. 29
Rafo  groups  are  commonly  unnamed,  or  their  names  shift  by  activity  (so  'the
vegetable  garden  group"  may  also  be 'the  soap-making  group"  at  other  times).  But
the larger ones usually have a  number of elected officers,  organized in
hierarchies  sometimes  modelled  after  governments  of larger  polities,  often  with
presidents,  secretaries,  treasurers,  messengers,  and sometimes  even 'police".
Women's  groups  are  not always  wholly  autonomous  as such;  commonly  a group  has
a trusted  male  patron  in  its  village  who  may  hold  the  group's  money  or,  with an
advantage  of  literacy  in  English  or  Arabic,  keep  the  accounts  as  a  favor.  While
the  head  of  a  men's  kafo  usually  plays  a  subordinate  role  to  the  village  headman,
the  head  of  a  women's  kafo  may  be,  by  virtue  of this  position,  the  most  powerful
woman  in  her  village.
Kafo  groups  have  traditionally  served  the  function  of  mobilizing  labor  for
free  use  by members,  for  hire to other  villagers,  or for  community  projects.
Today  they  also  variously  serve  other  economic  purposes.  Some  have collective
fields  for  cash  or food  crops,  and  collective  crop stores;  others  have fields
with collective  infrastructure  but  individuated  plot and  crop  ownership.  Some
have  small  restaurants,  hotels,  or  milling  machines.  Kafo  groups  save  money  from
members'  dues (often  less  than  a dalasi  per  member,  per  week)  and fines,  from
group labor  hired out, or from dances,  concerts,  wrestling  meets,  or market
stall  sales  they  organize,  among  other  ways.  Some  young  adult  groups  have  dances,- 27 -
concerts,  or sales  as fund-raisers,  members  paying  less  than  non-members.  Some
make  charitable  donations,  which  may take  the  form  of hard  goods,  to  hospitals
or mosques.  organizing  rites  of passage--naming  celebrations,  circumcisions,
weddings,  and funerals--is  an important  function  of kafo groups.  These,  of
course,  are  also  ways  of gaining  power  and  prestige,  and  redistributive  events
for  villagers  and  their  guests.
Kafo groups  handle  money  in various  fiduciary  ways.  Some  allocate  their
group  labor  on  credit.  Some  strong  kafos  save  money  in  group  bank  accounts;  they
may use several  senior  officers  as joint signatories  to ensure  no individual
has  private  access  to  the  savings.  A kafo  may lend  or give  money,  food,  seeds,
or tools  to  members  and  their  families,  to  or other  villagers,  members  getting
preferential  terms.  These  borrowers  sometimes  use the food  or money  for  their
own  ceremonies,  sometimes  for  school  fees  or  other  purposes.  Cash  loans  from  kafo
groups  to individual  villagers  in 1987-8  usually  ranged  from  about  10 to 100
dalasis,  and  more often  than  not they  carried  interest,  which  varied  between
about  10  percent  and  60 percent  (nominal  rates)  over six  months.  The  interest
was  used  by  some  to  buy  consumables  like  soap  for  distribution  to  members. 30 Some
groups  take  chattels  as loan  collateral.
A common  kind of kafo  makes its  purpose  to serve  the  needs  of members'
personal  or family  emergencies.  Such  groups  can  mobilize  contributions  quickly
for  hospital  trips,  court  bails,  house  rebuildings  after  storms,  and  the  like.
In  an  impoverished  country,  emergency  kafo  groups  have  an  advantage  over  "formal"
insurance  or savings  banking  for  emergencies,  in that they  keep the  money in
local  circulation  rather  than  draining  it  to cities.- 28 -
Kafo  groups  vary  substantially  in  organizational  strength  and  command  over
resources.  Some  save  thousands  of dalasis  and  made substantial  investments  in
community  agricultural  projects  and purchases,  build community  centers,  or
finance  political  campaigns,  while  others  seem  hamstrung  by problems  including
factionalism  and  graft  and  are  unable  to  mobilize  any  capital.  Often  the  women's
kafo  groups  are  more vigorous  and  economically  more important  than  the  men's,
but  any  kafo  is only  as strong  as  the  personalities  of its  leaders.
Recently some private voluntary organizations  in  The  Gambia have
experimented  with kafo groups  as conduits  for credit  for various  purposes,
including  small  enterprises  and  market  gardens.  (Some  of  the  kafo  groups  are  new
ones of the international  organizations'  own creation.)  The Department  of
Agriculture  has also  used  kafos  as channels  for  seed  and fertilizer  loans  for
group  farming  ventures.  Some  kinds  of kafo seem  to  hold promise  as a link  for
connecting  poorer farmers  with institutional  financial  resources.  A kafo's
strength  is  its  multi-functional  nature.  Since  no  one  wants  to  be  ostracized  from
a main village  kafo--this  can  mean becoming  a pariah--the  group  can sanction
its members (by fines  of a few dalasis)  for not participating  in its  work
gatherings;  it may similarly  be able to sanction  loan defaulters.  As yet,
however, little is known about what kinds of kafos can do these things
effectively. 31 And since  most  have little  experience  lending  large  amounts  of
money  to their  members,  so institutional  advances  in this  direction  should  be
cautious  and  gradual.- 29 -
Rotating  Savings  and  Credit  Associations
Contribution  clubs  for  money  are  a  newer  idea  in  rural  parts  of  The  Gambia
than  traditional  kafo  groups  for  labor.  A form  that  seems  to  be  spreading  outward
from the cities and towns is the osusu, or rotating  savings and credit
association  (ROSCA,  also  known  by  other  terms,  e.g.  merry-go-round  or  the  French
term  tontine).  This  is  a local-level  financial  mechanism  with parallels  in  all
coastal  countries  of  West  Africa  and  indeed,  as  anthropologists  and  others  have
found,  in patchy  distribution  all over  the  world (Geertz  1962,  Ardener  1964,
March and Taqqu 1986).32  In The C'mbia as elsewhere,  it is most commonly
organized  by  women.
The basic principle  is simple.  All members of the osusu make fixed
contributions  of  money  at  regular  intervals  (usually  daily,  weekly,  or  monthly,
though  10-day  intervals  were also  encountered).  Each  time,  one  member  takes  it
all. Each member takes a turn until the cycle is completed;  then it may
recommence.  For  one  whose  turn  comes  early  in  the  cycle,  the  groups  are  a  credit
mechanism;  for  one  whose  turn  falls  late,  they  are  more important  as a savings
mechanism.  (These  differences  are  evened  out  if  the  grsup  lasts  through  several
cycles.)  Since  Gambian  osusu  groups  usually  involve  no interest  payments,  a
member  who  withdraws  early  in  the  cycle  gains  an  interest-free  loan,  and  indeed,
if  inflation  is  taker,  into  account,  makes  a  real  net  gain.  One  who  withdraws  late
in the  cycle  has given  an interest-free  loan  and incurs  a  net loss;  but osusu
members  appear  to  feel  that  the  function  of  enforced  savings  is  valuable  enough
to  them  to offset  this  loss.
Gambian  osusu  groups  seem  to be especially  important  among  market  women
in  towns,  and  for  junior-grade  civil  servants  in  Banjul  and  in  the  province,  but- 30 -
they also appear  in farm.villages.  Osusus  operated  in four of five  villages
studied  during  the  time  of  research  (the  exception  being  a  Fula  village  in  Upper
River  Division),  though  some  villagers  everywhere  knew the idea  and some  had
belonged  to other  osusu  groups  when living  outside  their  villages. 33 In the
1987 survey,  17 percent  of the  women  interviewed  currently  belonged  to osusu
groups,  and  only one (1Z)  of the  men. In the  1988 survey,  farmers  were asked
whether  anyone  in  their  compounds  had  ever  belonged  to  one.  192  percent  said  one
or more women  had belonged;  4 percent  said  one or more men had belonged.  89
percent  of the respondents'  osusus  were in the  respondents'  home  villages,  3
percent  were in  nearby  towns,  and 8 percent  were in the  cities  of Banjul  and
nearby  Serrekunda.
Nearly  all  the  groups  in  the  villages  were female-only,  and  many  of  these
included  only  persons  of  comparable  ages  internally  (many  participants  variously
described  the  age-ranges  as "young",  "middle  aged",  or "old"). The groups  in
the  towns  and  cities  were  more  likely  to include  mixed  sexes.  Each  women's  osusu
group  represented  in  the  sample  existed  within  a single  village,  town,  or city;
and  in  the  largest village they were composed of members of  the  same
neighborhoods.  Most rural  village  osusus  consisted  of women roughly  the same
ages  (year of  circumcision  is  sometimes used  to  determine association
membership).  Some  consisted  entirely  of  kin,  others  not.  One  group  was  based  on
ethnic  identity,  its members representing  a minority  in their village.  The
overlaying  ties  of neighborhood,  gender,  age,  kinship,  and  ethnicity  all  seem
to give the  groups  the  capacity  for  peer-group  pressure  that  may  be needed  to
ensure  members'  regular  participation.  Each  group  did,  however,  have  a  recognized
leader  or  organizer.- 31 -
How  big  were the  groups?  The  osusus  in  which  infoi%ants  (1988)  themselves
had  participated  contained  between  7  and  31  members,  with  a  mean  of  13.4,  in  the
osusus  within  informants'  own  village:  between  7 and  50,  with a mean of 24.8,
in the  town  osusus;  and  17  and  30  in  two  urban  osusus  of Banjul  and  Serrakunda.
(Some  other osusu groups  of which we have learned  in the cities  are much
smaller).
Individual  contributions  in the osusus  ranged  from one to 20 dalasis
weekly,  or equivalent;  but in 91Z  of the groups  each  member  paid  between  one
dalasi  and five  dalasis  weekly  or equivalent,  i.e.,  less  than  one  U.S.  dollar
a  week.
A  number  of the  women  who belonged  to osusus  in the  villages  had some
small sources  of cash income  in addition  to seasonal  crops, for instance
small-scale  fried  food  vending  or palm-oil  processing.  The  women  in osusus  had
used  their  takings  for  a  variety  of  purposes,  including  ceremonies  (probably  the
most  common  use),  clothing,  livestock  purchases,  and (in  one  self-report  only)
seeds  for  mango  trees. 34
A male informant  who had recently  belonged  to an osusu  described  it as
being composed of 12 civil servants,  living in three villages,  who each
contributed  75  dalasis  monthly.  (Apparently  women  civil  servants  in the  cities
and  towns  also  make  osusu  contributions  on  this  order  of  size,  sometimes  putting
in a quarter  of their  salaries  monthly.)  Another  had belonged  to an osusu  of
young  men in  an army  camp,  each  contributing  7.50  dalasis  monthly.
Little is known about how long osusu groups last in The Gambia or
elsewhere.  The oldest  group  within the sample  was said to have functioned
continuously  for  ten  years,  and  others  had  worked  for  five  or six.  Many  operated- 32 -
only  during  the  dry  season  each  year,  suspending  operation  during  the  rains  when
members were  short of money; some others simply reduced the  amount of
contributions  during  the rainy season.  In a group that suspended  its main
function  seasonally,  members  continued  contributing  (a dalasi  each) to each
others'  ceremonies  during  the rainy  season,  reflecting  the  valued  social  and
symbolic  roles  of both  the  osusu  and  the  ceremonies.
Osusu  groups  in  the  Gambia  are  characteristic  of the  West African  forms
in that they do not involve  variable  individual  contributions.  The order  of
rotation  is  variously  pre-set  as  the  cycle  begins--in  one  case,  by  members'  ages
--or  determined  by lottery  upon  each  collection.  In either  case,  the  order  may
be broken  when particttlar  members  encounter  special  cash  needs.  Members  also
make  their  own  personal  arrangements  with  each  other  to swap  turns.
The  advantages  of  the  osusu  as  a  way  of  mobilizing  capital  are  several;  some
of these  are  also  enjoyed  by the  kafo  group:
1.  Osusu  membership  controls  the 'squawk  factor'  in saving,  as seen
earlier,  since gives  the saver  a socially  acceptable  excuse  for
denying  gifts  or loans  to  persons  who do  not  belong.
2.  The  osusu  provides  financial  services  to  people  who  may  be  ineligible
for  banking,  for  lack  of  initial  deposit  capital  or  other  problems.
3.  It  normally  requires  no collateral.
4.  It requires  little  or no paperwork  or travel;  in these  ways it
minimizes  "transaction  costs".
5.  It is not  intimidating,  as financial institutions  can be, to
illiterate  farmers.  It  need  not  involve  language  barriers.
6.  It can  provides  an occasion  for  social  gatherings.- 33 -
7.  Since  transactions  commonly  take  place  in  group  meetings,  thefts  and
cheating  can  be difficult.
8.  If the  group  wishes,  it  can  supervise  its  members'  expenditures  of
the funds,  choosing  a member  to spend  the money  with or for the
recipient  each  time  for  a pre-arranged  purpose.
9.  The  osusu  can  serve  as  a form  of insurance.
10.  Because it arises from members' initiative,  the osusu commonly
benefits  from  a  high level  of commitment.
11.  Where  members  belong  to  several  osusu  groups,  thes.e  lzelp  to  circulate
money  throuighout  a population  in  useful  sums.
12.  Savings  in  an  osusu  are  not  subject  to  government  scrutiny,  control,
or taxation.
There  are,  however,  disadvantages:
1.  The  year-round  osusu  is  not  ideally  suited  to  communities  depending
on  rainfed  agriculture,  because  in  these  all  members'  needs  for  money
are likely  to come at the same  season:  the "seasonal  covariance"
problem.  By the same  token,  Osusu  groups  are not very useful  for
financing  agricultural  inputs.
2.  Even in the  abundant  season,  one  cannot  always  get  the  money  when
one  wants it.  Most osusus  have flexible  orders  of rotation,  but
someone  else's  needs  may  be greater  when one  needs  the  money.
3.  The  group  depends  heavily  on  all  members'  continued  participation.
4.  The  group  canrnot  easily  accommodate  members  who  migrate  in  and  out
of a community.
5.  Savings  and  borrowings  in  an osusu  cannot  be kept secret  locally.- 34 -
Size  Considerations  in  ROSCAS
The  optimum  size  of an  osusu,  or the  range  of acceptable  sizes,  may  vary
with  the  task,  and  with  the  characters  of  the  members  or leaders.  It  might  also
very by gender,  by ,thnic  group,  and by age: little  is yet known on these
questions.
If  the  group  is  too  small,  these  problems  arises  (1)  The  potential  benefits
of joint  savings  or  co-operation  are  too  small  to repay  the  efforts  of  joining
up; (2)  each  member  can simply  avoid  the  other(s)  when he or she  has  not  been
co-operating.  The smaller  the  group,  the  easier  the  avoidance. (3)  There  is
not enough  likelihood  that  the  members  also  belong  to other  organizations  in
common,  e.g.  sport  groups,  age-sets,  etc.,  through  which  to  apply  pressure. (4)
The  potential  damage  of  a  member's  quitting  or  moving  away  is  too  great.
If the  group  is too  big,  these  problems  arise:  (1)  Each  member  will lose
only  a very small  fraction  of his  or her investment  by the  non-cooperation  of
one  other  member. There  is  little  incentive  to  pursue  him  or her, or  work to
enlist  other  to apply  pressure. (2)  Where  the  group  functions  on a principle
of rotation,  it  is  too  infrequent  that  each  member  gets  his  or  her share  of the
group's  rewards. (3)  Communication  between  members  gets  too  hard.  (4)  It is
too  likely  that  some  members  will  move away.
The  optimal  sizes  or acceptable  ranges  for  solidarity  groups  seem  to  vary
widely,  and  may depend  on the  nature  of the  activities,  but in  many societies
around  the  world,  5-8  people  seem  to  be an especially  appropriate  range  for
saving  and  loan  projects.  Many  indigenous  Gambian  village  kafo  and  osusu  groups
are rather larger, and the local models should probably be  followed in
interventions.35- 35 -
While  urban  savings  are  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper,  it  is  worth  noting
that  most saving  methods  described  above,  including  the  kondaneh  boxes,  the
money-keepers,  and  rotating  savings  and  credit  associations  (osusu  groups),  are
also common  in the cities  of Banjul  and Serrekunda.  Osusus  are common,  for
instance,  among  secretaries  and  messengers  of  government  ministries,  and  not  just
among  people  without  access  to  banks  or  other  "formal"  financial  institutions. 36
Whether  to  Act  Upon  ROSCAS
In  development  agencies  there  is  now  considerable  interest  in  finding  ways
of 'plugging  in' external funding to rotating credit and savings associations,
though  there  is no evidence  in The  Gambia  and  very little  elsewhere  that  this
is approach  can succeed.  Certainly,  the largely  female  composition  of these
groups  and the  peer-pressure  elements  are  attractive  features  to donors.  The
incorporation  of  savings  with  credit  is  something  many  lenders  are  now striving
for,  and  this  principle  is  already  woven  into  the  fabric  of the  osusu.  It is  not
clear,  however,  that  men  would  not  take  the  groups  over if  substantial  amounts
of cash  were infused  from  outside.  It is likely,  too, that new groups  would
spring  up  overnight  to receive  funds,  without  the  overlapping  bonds  of kinship
and  .s:;.er  social  ties  that  make  osusu  groups  work.
Perhaps  the surest  way in  which institutions  can  work  with osusu  groups
is  simply  by  teaching  about  how  they  work,  in  schools  or other  groups.  But  this
should  probably  not  be seen  locally  as a  government  initiative,  for  part  of  the
appeal  of the  osusu  to its  members  is  that  it is  truly  their  own.  Osusu  groups
are  functioning  comparatively  well,  though  the  resources  they  muster  are  limited;
and in  the  end  the  best  way of  helping  them  might  be to leave  them  alone.- 36 -
The  osusu  does,  however,  have features  worth  emulating  in the  design  of
institutional  credit schemes  to serve complementary  functions.  The social
pressure  within  a group  of  about  a  dozen  people  to  repay  (and  even  to  use  credit
wisely)  is clearly  a desireable  feature.  At the  primary  level,  at least,  the
number  of farmers  who have collective  responsibility  for repayment  should  be
limited:  the  members  of the  group  should  know each  other  and  have  other  kinds
of influence  to  bear  upon each  other.  Second,  the  small  group  should  probably
have a single  leader,  chosen  by the members,  as the osusu  has. Third,  the
integration  of savings  and  credit--they  are  the  same  transactions  in  the  osusu
--gives  members  the  pride  of accomplishment:  they  earn  what they  borrow.  They
have  a financial  investment  in  the  group's  success.
Other  General  Lessons  from  Informal  Financial  Institutions
Kafo  and  osusu  groups  are  found  among  both  men  and  women,  but  in  the  rural
areas,  they  seem  more important  to  women;  and  the  associations  that  succeed  in
rural  financial  matters  usually  are  usually  single-sex.  There  are lessons  in
this.  Gender  and age specificity  of rural  kafo and osusu  groups  cut  down the
chances  of great  disparities  between  members'  solvency  or financial  abilities.
A rough  comparability  in  turn  helps  prevent  some  members  from  easily  domineering
or exploiting  the  others,  though  of course  either  can still  happen. 37 Gender
and  age  specificity  also  make  it  more  likely  that  members  will  have  other  kinds
of contacts  with each  other,  and  thus  ways  of devising  their  own  sanctions  for
non-cooperF.tion.
In external  interventions,  dividing  projects for women and men into
separate  but  parallel  projects  helps  keep the  control  over  gender  distribution- 37 -
in an agency's  hands,  and helps  to prevent  men's  monopolizing  resources. A
similar  principle  may apply  to age  groups.  Dividing  project  resources  between
younger  and  older  people's  kafos  can  help  ensure  a  more  balanced  distribution.
(Leaving  out  one  group  or another,  however,  may induce  it to try  to sabotage  a
project.)  The  experiences  of private  voluntary  organizations  in  The  Gambia,  as
elsewhere  in  Africa,  suggests  that  credit  to  women  is  not  necessarily  harder  to
collect  than  credit  to  men. Provided  women's  borrowing  groups  are  appropriately
constituted,  it  may  even  be easier.
For leadership  and group  membership,  insiders  can choose  each  other  on
character  better  than  outsiders  can  choose  them. They  are  also,  of  course,  more
aware  of  interpersonal  "chemistry'  in  the  groups:  potential  harmonies  or  clashes
between  the personalities.  This  may take a lifetime  of mutual  acquaintance.
Local  leaders  such  as  alkalos  and  women's  kafo  heads  are  usually  chosen  with  much
deliberation;  it  generally  makes  sense  for  projects  to  use  these  local  leaders
as contact  points,  or  as pressure  points  if  necessary.
The local-level  groups  most likely  to succeed  in  mobilizing  or  managing
finances  are those  that exist already  for other  purposes,  such as farm-work
groups,  youth  activity  groups,  sport  groups,  etc. The  groups'  having  more  than
one  function  ensures  that  members  have  ways  to  exert  pressure  on  each  other  when
needed.  They  will usuallv  be bounded  in  membership,  for instance  by residence
in a single  village.
SimplicIty  seems to be a  main key  to  success in  local financial
organizations.  They  tend  to  have  clearly  delimited  membership,  and  to  use  strict
and  regular  meeting  schedules,  standard  contributions,  standard  fines  for  non-
participation,  and  round  numbers.- 38-
Probably  nothing  should  be  issued  on  credit  without  some  contribution  from
the borrowers  themselves,  whether in the form of capital,  labor,  or local
materials. Such  a rule is important  for several  reasons:  (1)  It screens  out
borrowers  who are  not serious,  capable,  or organized. (2)  It gives  borrowers
an investment  in the enterprise  or development,  and thus (3) it adds their
scrutiny  to  the  financial  management  of local  project  organizers,  an important
factor  in remote  areas  hard  to  monitor  or supervise  regularly  from  the  capital
city. (4)  Demanding  a  contribution  also  helps  to  accustom  farmers  not  to  expect
free-hand-outs  in the future.  Projects  will succeed  only when rural  people
consider  them  as substantially  their  own.
Finance  Based  on Groups  and  Individuals
A general  observation  emerging  from  studies  like  ours  on rural  financial
systems  in  The  Gambia  and  other  West  African  countries  is  that  group-based  saving
and  credit  systems  tend  to  work  more smoothly  than  individual-based  ones  among
the  rural  poor,  and  particularly  among  women. 38 One reason,  as seen  earlier,
is  that  they  allow  individuals  to  save  without  seeming  selfish  to  their  neighbors
and  kin,  an important  point  in  most  of rural  West  Africa. Another  is  that  the
groups  and  their  leaders  can  serve  as  conduits  to  institutions  like  banks,  which
ordinary  rural  people  may  perceive  as  inaccessible,  and  may  reassure  the  members
who feel  that  approaching  institutions  is  risky. Group-based  saving  and  credit
does  not  mean  resources  cannot  be  directed  to  individual  members--often  they  can
and should--but  rather,  that local groups  are used as units of collective
responsibility  for  collections  and  repayments.- 39 -
V. BANKING
The commercial  banking  system  is now almost  useless  for rural  people.
Gambian farmers perceive banks as  remote, intimidating,  and  not  fully
trustworthy,  and  by  and  large  they  do  not  go  to them. 39 The  senior  officers  of
the  banks  in  The  Gambia,  on  the  other  hand,  imagine  smallholding  farmers  farmers
as too poor  and financially  inactive  to be of interest,  and not  particularly
trustworthy  as  borrowers.  There  are  only  two  up-river  branches:  outside  Banjul
and  nearby  Serrekunda  and  Bakao,  commercial  banks  are  found  only  in  Farafeni  and
Basse.40
The  numbers  of  rural  bank  depositors  clearly  reflect  the  distances,  social
and  geographic.  A 1975-6  survey  of rural  Gambian  villages  found  that only  two
(2Z)  of 94  informants  had  bank  savings  (Dunsmore  et al.  1976:  307).  In our  1987
survey,  four  (3Z)  of  138  male  and  female  informants  stated  they  had  deposits  in
commercial  banks;  four  others,  again  3Z, said  they had money in post office
savings.  Only  one  of  69  women  interviewed  had  a savings  account  in  either  a  bank
or post  office  savings.
Branch  bank  information  confirmed  that  most  farmer  depositors  hold  amounts
below  about  250  dalasis,  that  very few  of them are  women,  and that almost  no
farmers  borrow  from  banks.  In  May  1987  the  Basse  branch  of the  GCDB  (one  of  only
two  branches  of the  bank  outside  the  greater  Banjul  area)  reported  that  492  of
its  858 savings  depositors  had less  than  250  dalasis  in their  accounts  (i.e.,
less  than the  value  of one  sheep). Interviews  with bank staff  suggested  that
most of the roughly  100 farmers (people  whose primary  source  of income  is
farming)  saving  at the  bank  were among  those  with less  than  250  dalasis. Only- 40 -
an estimated  10-15  percent  of the 858  depositors  were women.  Only about  five
farmers  were  currently  borrowing  from  the  branch.
Since saving  at home or with money-keepers,  instead  of with financial
institutions,  costs  farmers  the  opportuiity  of earning  any  interest  (lately  152
in  the  banks),  the  problems  with  banking  appear  serious.  When  asked  in  a  neutral
way about  their  reasons  for  not  using  banks,  farmers  in the  villages  surveyed
cited  several:  the  distance  and  prohibitive  travel  costs,  inconvenient  opening
schedules,  requirements  of  minimum  deposits,  difficult  paperwork,  and  distrust
of clerks. Some cited with bitterness  their recent experience  with the
Agricultural  Development  Bank,  which  had  taken  deposits  in  the  early  1980s  and
ceased  operating  without  refunding  them.  While  Islam,  strictly  speaking,  forbids
interest  charges,  the fact that many rural  Gambians  do charge interest  in
informal  lending  (and  do so  with a variety  of legal  devices,  hiyal in  Arabic,
to dodge the prohibitions--see  Shipton  1990a) suggests  that the interest-
collecting  aspect  of savings  banking  is unlikely  by itself  to stop  savers  who
would  otherwise  be interested  in  banking.41
Rural  Gambians  are  generally  more  concerned  about  security  of savings,  and
about  availability  for  emergencies,  than  about  interest  earned  or  forgone.  They
will  also  save  money  with institutions  or  clubs  (where  they  do)  in  order  to  gain
access  to credit  when  needed. But  many  are  unaware  that  banks  pay  interest  on
savings. And  most do not  have access  to the  kind of information  or schooling
that  would  let  them  calculate  inflationary  losses  and  interest  opportunity  costs.
Many  cannot  appreciate  fully  how  quickly  they  lose  purchasing  power  by  hoarding
money  or depositing  it  with  keepers  who  pay  no interest.- 41 -
Though few farmers  use banks now, most interviewed  responded  quite
positively  to the idea  of mobile  banks,  saying  they  would like to see these
tried,  or tried  again,  in their  areas. 42 Many said  they  would  prefer  to see
small  branch  banks  set  up  near  them,  since  they  would  have  doubts  abou-  putting
their  money into  something  that  wuuld  roll  away.  But clearly,  inaccessibility
has  been  a  major  barrier  to institutional  savings.
The commercial  banks are the existing organizations  with the most
managerial  competence  to  handle  a system  of rural  branch  banks. Unfortunately
they  are  the  organizations  likely  to  be  least  interested  in  serving  rural  people,
and so may  need added incentives  and safeguards  to be provided  by large
international  development  organizations.  Informal  discussions  with  some  officers
of large  agencies  suggest  potential  interest  in  providing  guarantees.
If  banks  are  to  serve  Gambian  farmers,  and  particularly  women,  it  is  likely
to  be  by  group  access  through  kafo  groups  and  other  village-based  associations.
Private  voluntary  organizations  (PVOs,  or non-governmental  organizations)  may
find  a  useful  role  in  making  banks  more  accessible  to  women's  groups:  explaining
the  pros  and  cons  of  banking,  and  serving  as  screening  mechanisms  for  the  banks,
on  one  hand,  and  bureaucracy-cutters  for  the  farmers  on  the  other.  Brokering  the
two-way  flow  of  information  is  a  role  the  PVOs  can  more  easily  serve  than  banking
itself,  since  most  lack  the  funds  to  keep  trained  money  managers  on  their  staffs.
The  large  agencies,  for  their  part,  can  provide  guarantees  to  back  up new  bank
experiments,  and they can provide  workshops  for coordinating  activities  of
various  PVOs.- 42 -
Agricultural  Seasonality  and  Savings  Banking
If institutional  saving  facilities  set  up  more rural  branches,  mobile  or
stationary,  seasonality  will put them to a stern test.  The predominance  of
rainfed  agriculture  in  the  economy  and  the  covariance  of incomes  make financial
intermediation  hard.  Most farmers  are  likely  to deposit  at the same  time (the
trade season, December-February)  and to withdraw at the same time (June-
September).  Moreover,  most farmers  who  borrow  are  likely  to do so at  the  same
time  of year  all are  making  withdrawals,  and  not to repay  until  the following
trade  season.  A  problem  is  that  a  bank  has  stronger  financial  incentives  to  make
the rounds  (if  using  mobile  branches)  or stay  open (if  using  stationary  ones)
in the 'trade  season",  when farmers  have significant  sums  of  money  to deposit,
than during the  rest of the year, when farmers are more  interested  in
withdrawals.  A  bank  able  to  use  Gambian  capital  domestically  or  overseas  during
the  period  of savings,  and  to import  capital  during  the  period  of withdrawing
and borrowing,  might  be most able to keep its system  afloat.  So banks  with
international  links  may  be best  placed  to  accommodate  Gambian  seasonality.
An  Untried  Strategy  for  the  Adventurous
While  the  issue  of  interest  rates  in  institutional  saving  cannot  be  treated
in  detail  here  (see  Shipton  1990a),  some  possibilities  must  be  noted.  If  interest
rates  on  commercial  bank  credit  are  raised  from  their  present  rates  of 27  to  28
percent  per annum  (as  of October  1989),  interest  on savings  deposits  (12-14z)
should  be raised  too.  The low  or negative  real  interest  rates  (inflation  was
12.5Z  in 1987/8)  may help explain  why bank savings  have been so unattractive
for  potential  rural  depositors. 43- 43 -
Subsidized  credit  has been the norm for financial  institutions  in The
Gambia,  as  in  other  poor  countries.  Consistently,  staffers  of  large  aid  agencies
have  sought  in  this  way  to  dispose  of  large  amounts  of  money  (see  Tendler  1975),
and  statespersons  and  local politicians,  to dispense patronage and win
supporters.  The  approach  has  brought  about  familiar  institutional  problems  (see
Von Pischke et al. 1983, Adams et al. 1984). Some analysts  believe as a
conclusion,  or as  an ideological  principle,  that  subsidies  generally  should  be
reduced  or  eliminated,  as  has  gradually  been  happening  in  The  Gambia.  This  "pro-
market"  approach  has indeed  become  a new orthodoxy  in financial  agencies,  and
there  is  some  practical  sense  in  it,  but  credit  subsidies  persist  across  Africa.
Apparently  no institution  in The  Zambia  (or  perhaps  even  in Africa)  has
yet  been  documented  to  have  tried  a  radical  reversal,  subsidizing  savings  rather
than  credit,  as  a  rural  development  strategy.  Low  ceilings  on  such  deposits  might
discourage  abuse  by the rich.  The farmers  and rural poor would become the
"moneylenders'.  The approach  would  probably  require  some  cooperation  between
banks,  private  voluntary  organizations,  and (as  guarantors  at  least)  large  aid
agencies.  There  would be pitfalls  to avoid,  of course,  and transaction  costs
would  be  high. 44 Whether  such  a  program  would  be  administratively  workable,  and
whether  subsidizing  it  would cost international  lenders  and donors  more than
costly  conventional  credit  schemes,  are  unknown.  This  bold  approach  is  not  for
the faint-hearted  or insolvent  institution,  and certainly,  any such project
should  be small  and  experimental  at first.
It  should  be remembered,  in  establishing  more  banking  opportunities,  that
not  all  rural  people  want them.  Many  are  satisfied  with saving  in the  forms  of
livestock,  jewelry,  etc.  These  preferences  should  be respected.  If it  does  not- 44 -
pay substantial  interest  to depositors,  savings  banking  does little  more than
sap  wealth  from rural  communities  to towns  and  cities.  And interest,  even if
redefined  as *profit",  itself  involves  religious  and  moral  quandaries  in  a  mainly
Muslim  country.  Rural  Gambians  are  not  of a single  voice  in demanding  savings
facilities.  What they  want is  more  options.
VI.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION:  BALANCING  CREDIT  WITH  SAVINGS
To conclude,  rural  Gambians  save in diverse  ways.  The diversity  and
complexity  of  rural  savings  have  their  own  rationalesi  and  currency  instabilities
make it sensible  to put savings  into  other  forms.  Saving,  like  borrowing  and
lending,  is part and  parcel  of social  life;  and any institut4on  that  becomes
involved  in Sahelian  rural finance  is also involved  with networks  of kin,
neighbors,  and  age-mates.
It is untrue,  as sometimes  said,  that rural  Gambians  do not carry  over
wealth  from  year  to year.  But  most of  what they  do save  over  periods  of years
is in non-monetary  forms.  They  choose  these  forms  for  many reasons:  to avoid
inflation  or political  and  regulatory  control  over their  assets;  to gain the
benefits  of  milk,  manure,  and  traction  that  animals  provide,  or  to  gain  increases
through  livestock  breeding;  to  consolidate  their  savings  into  indivisible  forms
or  forms  their  relatives  may  help  keep  them  from  spending  rashly;  to  avoid  guilt
associated  with overt  interest  earnings;  and  to cut  their  losses  to collapsing
banks.  Diversifying  savings  into  many  forms  means  reducing  risks.  It  also  means
keeping  the wealth less conspicuous,  both to other local  people  and to tax
collectors.  There  is  obviously  sense  in these  strategies,  even  though  some  of- 45 -
the  means  of saving  that farmers  choose  provide  them sub-optimal  earnings  in
monetary  terms.
It is also untrue  that Gambian farmers  are uninterested  in monetary
savings.  The  kondaneh  boxes,  the rural  deposit-takers,  and the requests  for
infrequent  wage  payments  all  testify  that  many  rural  people  want  ways of  saving
cash.  So  too  does  rural  people's  liking  to  convert  small  notes  to  large  ones (as
men  try  to  convert  small  livestock  to  large  stock).  While  some  economists  assume
farming  people  to have a "liquidity  preference",  these  patterns  indicate  the
opposite,  an "illiquidity  preference".
Part  of  the  reason  why  rural  Gambians  seem  to  save  little  of  their  wealth
in  money is that  there  are social  pressures  against  hoarding  during  times  of
general  scarcity.  This is why group  savings  approaches  appear  more likely  to
succeed  than  approaches  based  merely  on individuals:  they  make it  possible  to
save  without  appearing  selfish.  This  principle,  at the root  of the  osusu,  may
be worth incorporating  into institutional  financial  systems  as well.  The
positive  responses  to questions  about  mobile  banking  (and  small  rural  branch
banks)  suggest  a practical  path  for  public  or private  agencies  to follow,  and
untried  adjustments  in  interest  policies  suggest  room  for  experimentation.  More
broadly,  planners  in institutions  wishing  to  assist  Gambians  to save  resources
should  consider  interventions  in  crop  storage--incidentally  an approach  low  in
recurring  expenses--or  livestock  health.  The aim should  not be to "capture"
local  savings,  but  to  augment  and  supplement  them.
Credit  is  not  the  answer  to  all  financial  problems  in  development,  and  it
is  perhaps  one  that  both  international  and  national  institutions  have  tended  to
rush into  too  readily.  The  most  obvious  fact  about  credit  seems  ironically  to- 46 -
be the  one  most  often  overlooked;  credit  indebts.  People  who  have  borrowed  feel
behind;  the  English  phrase  "in  the  hole"  expresses  a  position  rural  Gambians  know
too  well.  As some  farmers  explained  it,  one  who  has  a loan  to repay  is  working
for  someone  else,  and  this  drains  incentives  to  work. 45 (This  is particularly
so  where  the  lender  is  perceived  as  an  alien  institution.)  That  Gambians  borrow
less  from  local  traders  after  the  good  years  than  after  the  bad, and  that  few
of  the  richest  farmers  interviewed  borrowed  from  these  at  all,  suggest  again  that
rural  Gambians  basically  do  not like  to  be in  debt  to strangers  (especially  at
the  kinds  of  interest  rates  that  make  institutions  financially  viable).  They  know
the "debt  ratchet"  principle,  the  vicious  circle  whereby  interest  charges  can
progressively  impoverish  farmers  and  make  them  increasingly  dependent  on  credit.
That  the  co-operatives  have  witnessed  heavy  demand  for  credit  seems  to  be  largely
due to the easy lending  terms  offered,  and to a history  of lax collection.
Gambians  seem to feel they need both private  lenders  and co-operatives  for
credit,  but  they  are  not  happy  with  either.
Nor  are  the  motives  behind  all  institutional  credit  entirely  altruistic.
In  agencies,  government,  and  cooperatives,  credit  seems  to  be used  at times  as
a  way of moving  money  to satisfy  committees  and  office  superiors,  and  perhaps
as  a  way  of extending  political  patronage  to  regional  or local  power-brokers  or
a  voting  public.  These  things  do  not  mean  that  credit  cannot  do its  recipients
any  good,  but that  it  may  be continued  too  readily  when it does  not. If it is
decided  to extend  easy gifts  for  political  reasons,  these  should  be known as
grants  and  not loans,  in  order  to  give  true  credit  programs  a chance.- 47 -
If institutional  interest  rates are raised  to reflect real costs in
institutional  credit, in the interests  of financial  viability.  it may be
worthwhile  at the same time to re-assess  critically  the role of credit in
general.  Where interest  rates are based on real costs, borrowing  is more
expensive  than  saving. 46 Farmers  who  cannot  afford  to  save  can  even  less  afford
to  borrow.
The  rural  financial  mechanisms  working  least  well are  those  designed  for
credit  only. It  has  been  the  habit  of  most  large  and  small  development  agencies
with resources  to  dispose  of,  to look  for  ways  to lend,  rather  than  to examine
local  resources  that  might be mobilized,  or to do both.  (There  are a few
encouraging  exceptions.) Rural  people  consider  most of the resulting  credit
projects  to  belong  to  someone  else:  the  capital  city,  the  Government,  the  whites.
By  contrast,  In  The  Gambia  as  elsewhere  in  Africa,  the  credit  systems  that
appear  to  work  most smoothly,  like  the  informal  osusu  groups,  appear  to  be  those
that  incorporate  savings  and link  them  with lending.  Savings  in the  osusu  are
the  same  as credit  (the  same  transactions  functioning  as one  or the  other,  for
different  members  at different  times).  The  groups  embody  several  other  sound
principles:  local  initiative  and  capital,  character  screening  by  members,  peer
group  pressure  as  the  main  means  of  enforcing  co-operation  and  repayment.  Osusus
spring  up by voluntary  initiative  in rural  towns  and  villages,  as in cities.
Although  some  suspend  operation  seasonally,  some  last  well over  a decade,  and
as  they  dissolve,  new  ones  form.  These  systems  rural  people  consider  their  own.
These  observations  suggest  an  incorporation  of  savings  components  in  credit
programs  wherever  the institution  in question  is financially  sound  enough  to
merit farmers'  investment,  and wherever  it can build upon existing  social- 48 -
networks. 47 Much remains  to be learned  about how, and whether, financial
institutions  can  emulate  the  financial  principles  observed  already  working  in
the  rural  areas.  Whether  savings  and  credit  are  linked  or  not,  however,  farmers
clearly  need some  of  each,  and  in  a better  mixture  than  they  have them  now.  In
the  long  run,  the  rope  of  credit  and  debt  without  the  box  of saving  can  scarcely
serve  farmers'  interests.  Rural  Gambiar.s  aeem  to  be saying  they  need  balance  in
their financial livess between s.ving and credit, between liquidity  and
illiquidity,  and  between  individual  and  group  action.- 49 -
TABLE  l:  Preferred  Means  of Saving  Money
1988
Men  Women  Both
Keeping  for  self  47Z  462  47Z
Banks*  31Z  19Z  25Z
Money-keepers  162  212  18Z
P.O.  Saving  2Z  OZ  12
Burial  2Z  OZ  1Z
Other  22  14Z  82
TOTALS  1002  1OOZ  1OOZ
nm  51  52  103
(* Notes  Preferred  means stated  differ  can differ from means actually
practiced. Far  fewer  than  the  percentages  indicated  acutally  used  banks).- 50 -
TABLE  2:  Relationships  of Informal  Money-Keepers  To Depositors
1988
Money-keepers  Depositors  Interviewed
Male  Female  Both
Kin:
Spouse  1  10  11
Parent  4  5  9
Sibling  (full)  0  2  2
Offspring  0  0  0
Other  kin  6  5  11
Subtotal,  kin  11 (552)  22 (79Z)  33 (692)
Non-kin  9  6  15
TOTALS  20 (lOOt)  28 (1002)  48 (1002)- 51 -




Male  Female  Both
Male  16 (80X)  4 (20Z)  20 (100?)
Female  18 (64Z)  10 (36Z)  28 (1002)
Total  34 (71Z)  14 (292)  48 (100Z)- 52 -
FOOTNOTES
1. The  calculation  includes  non-agricultural  as  well  as agricultural  debts.
2. The fifth  village,  being  too large  tc cover,  required  a more limited  but
systematic  sample  of one  side.
3. See  Shipton  1987,  Appendix  on research  methods,  for  more details.
4. Our informants  in the 1988  survey,  by language,  were Mandinko  (36Z),  Fula
(28Z),  Wolof (21Z),  Jola (82),  Serahuli  (42),  and others (3Z).  In the 1983
national  census,  not  a  wholly  reliable  source  but  the  best  available,  the  largest
ethnic  groups  in The Gambia  were listed  as follows:  Mandinko (40.4z),  Fula
(18.8Z),  Wolof  (14.62),  Jola (10.32),  Serahuli (8.2Z),  and others (7.7z)
including  Arabic-speaking  Mauritanians  (Gambia  1986:  8).  International  seasonal
labcr  migrations,  among  other  things,  make census-taking  difficult.  Some  have
also  questioned  whether  the  national  census  may  have  under-enumerated  Fula  for
political  reasons.
5. I  hope  to discuss  in  another  study  some  of the  interethnic  similarities  and
differences  in  Gambian  economic  life.
6. The  clash  of  cultures  in  the  area  of interest  rates  and ratios  is  discussed
more fully  in Shipton  1990a.
7.  Patrilineages  are  kin  groups  related  through  males.  The  castes  are  in-marrying
occupational  categories  whose  members,  recruited  by heredity,  may or may not
practice  the specified  occupations.  See Diop 1981 on Wolof castes  and their
economic  importance.
8. See  the  essays  in  Moock  1986  on other  parts  of the  continent.
9.  For  livestock  counts  see  Derman  et  al.  1985:  112;  Mills  et al.  1988,  Sumberg
1988,  Sumberg  and Gilbert  1988.  As elsewhere  in Africa  south  of the Sahara,
livestock  loans and (among  some groups) secrecy  about numbers owned makes
livestock  tallies  difficult.
10. Marriage payments  among Gambian peoples are paid mainly in cash and
manufactured  goods,  however,  not  in  cattle  as  among  many  eastern  African  groups.
11.  Analogies  between  livestock  and  cash  are  common.  When  I  once  asked  a  Mandinko
informant  why  he  preferred  large  to  small  stock,  he  asked,  "Would  you  rather  have
a 10 dalasi  note or a 25?'  --  an argument  he knew  was hard to refute  without
pedantry.  Mandinko  say  their  grandparents  historically  referred  to  livestock  as
fangkanta  (lit.  self-guard),  or reserve;  they  use  the  same  term  now  for  personal
cash  savings.
12.  This  applies  to  other  permanent,  heritable  lineage  property  like  compounds.- 53 -
13. West African literature  refers  often to earrings  as wealth. See, for
instance,  Camara  Laye's  autobiographical  Dark  Child,  in  which the father  is a
goldsmith,  and Sembene  Oumane's  novelette  and  film,  The  Money  Order,  in  which
they  are pawned  to a usurious  Mauritanian  merchant  in Dakar  as a desperation
measure,  and  lost.
14.  Only  one  such  transaction  was reported  in interviews.
15. In a preliminary  count  of data from the two  villages  studied  in Western
Division,  women  who  grew  groundnuts  harvested  an average  of 732  as  much  as  'men
who  grew  them. On  average,  the  men sold  73Z  of their  crop,  stored  202  as seed,
and stored  32 as food. The  women  sold  652  of theii  crop,  stored  132  as seed,
and  stored  232  as  food. While  only  272  of the  men  who  grew  groundnuts  kept  any
after  harvest  for  use  as food,  92  percent  of the  women  groundnut  growers  kept
some  for  food. All  the  men growers  and  912  of the  women  growers  kept some  for
seed. Of  course,  some  groundnuts  originally  intended  as  seed  get  consumed  before
planting  time.
16.  Because  the  volume  of a storehouse  increases  faister  than  the  surface  as its
size  increases,  by simple  geometric  principle,  there  is an economic  advantage
in larger  storehouses.  But,  as seen later,  there  are  social  disadvantages  in
stores  for  more than  one  village.
17.  Survey  response  percentages  in this  paper  refer  to the  1988 survey  unless
otherwise  indicated.  Figures  given  are  "valid  percentages",  i.e.,  they  refer  to
totals excluding "no answer' or  "unintelligible"  responses  and  responses
discovered  in  cross-checks  to  be inaccurate.  Figures  are  rounded  to  the  nearest
percentage  point.
18.  Saving  by burial  has long  occurred  elsewhere  in  Africa.  The  late  President
Jomo  Kenyatta  of  Kenya  once  reported  on the  Kikuyu,  'they  say  it is better  to
buy  a  sheep  or  goat  instead  of shillings  which,  if  buried  in  the  ground  (the  only
form  of saving  money  the  majority  of  the  people  know),  would  rot  and  lose  their
value"  (1965  [1938]:  66).
19. This is not, of course,  to say all Gambian  marriages  are suspicious  or
hostile.  They  vary  as  anywhere.  But  ties  between  spouses  often  seem  more  distant
than some "blood"  kin  ties,  and  cash is  more likely  than  other  commodities  to
be privately  stashed.  As discussed  below,  spouses  sometimes  do specifically
entrust  money  to each  other  for  safe  keeping.  See  Field  1940,  Moock  1986,  and
Shipton  1989  for  other  discussions  of  the  separation  of  resources  between  spouses
elsewhere  in  Africa  south  of the  Sahara.
20. For comparisons  frora  Senegal  and Niger,  respectively,  see Tuck 1983:  66;
Graham  et al.1987:  Ch. IV,  18-21.
21. The  difference  between  the figures  is more than  men's  superior  access  to
banks as alternatives  might account  for. It suggests  that men have greater
confidence  in their  own saving  means,  perhaps,  or that  women  are  more readily
accepted  as depositors.- 54 -
22.  In  the  1988  survey,  farmers  who  used  money-keepers  were  asked  what  they  liked
about  this  system  of  saving.  62?  cited  safety  or  trustworthiness.  18Z  said  they
liked  being  able to withdraw  whenever  they chose,  7Z cited  proximity  of the
moneylender,  and  13?  had  other  answers.  Of course,  these  reasons  mentioned  are
not  mutually  exclusive.
23.  Whether  men should  be recruited  in preference  to women,  to reflect  local
financial  practice,  or the  reverse  of each,  to pursue  political  ideals,  is an
important  related  ethical  question.  As so  often,  foreign  agents  have  here the
awkward  choice  of  being  sexists  or cultural  imperialists.
24.  One infirmant  mentioned  the  problem  of risk.  Opinion  polling  of this sort
is only of limited  use in most African  contexts  because  informants'  finely
developed  etiquette  can  produce  much  second-guessing.  Also,  of  course,  this  sub-
sample  was self-selected  as people  who liked  money-keepers.
25. Little  research  has been done on attitudes  toward  money  notes and coins
themselves  and their denominations.  Gambian  coins in the smallest  Gambian
denominations  (in  multiples  of  bututs,  hundredths  of  a  dalasi)  are  sometimes  used
by themselves,  especially  by women  and  children,  but men and others  who save
large  amounts  like  to convert  their  money  into  the  largest  notes  possible,  to
help  protect  themselves  against  temptations.  Printing  more  notes  in  denominations
larger  than  25 dalasis  might  not  just  serve  the  convenience  of bank  clerks  and
the rich  (who  queue  up in  urban  banks  to count  out  many  hundreds  of  notes for
deposits  or  withdrawals)  but  also  help and  encourage  cash  saving  among  poorer
people,  for  better  or  worse.  There  would  be dangers,  however,  in problems  of
innumeracy.
26. The  Mandinka  term  Kafo (corresponding  roughly  to yirde in Fula,  morom  in
Wollof)  is  sometimes  used  by  non-Mandinko.  In  Fula,  kafo  groups  are  more  commonly
called  compin,  from "company".
27. This discussion  of village kafo groups has benefitted from  shared
preliminary  findings  of surveys  by E. Bazalgette,  F. Le Grand,  and  A. Sillah.
Separately,  they  and  I  have  interviewed  on  the  topic  in  over  40  Gambian  villages.
Mandinka  villages  commonly  have  three  age-graded  kafo  groups  for  men  and  two  or
three  for  women.  For a cross-ethnic  comparison  of Gambian  age-sets  and age-
grades,  see  Sonko-Godwin  1986:  36-50;  see  also  Dunsmore  et  al.  1976:  277-8.  Much
more  is available  in the  literature  on Senegal.
28.  E. Bazalgette  and  F.  Le Grand,  personal  communications.
29.  Some  women  who  have  married  near  their  natal  homes  belong  to the  kafos  of
their  parents'  and  husbands'  villages.
30.  One  powerful  woman  villager  interviewed  had  borrowed  several  hundred  dalasis
from  a  kafo  and re-lent  the  money  to  other  villagers  at  double  the  interest.
31.  See  March  and  Taqqu  1986  for  insights  gained  in other  countries.- 55 -
32.  Literature  concerning  osusus  and  related  financial  mechanisms  in  West  Africa
appear in Rural Africana no. 2, Fall 1978.
33.  Tuck reports  that in her sample  of 54  Senegalese  households  in 11 rural
villages,  342  of the households  had members in rotating  savings  and credit
associations.  She  finds  that  "only  women  belong".  (1983:68)
34.  Tuck  reports  that in her  Senegalese sample, 701  used  osusu  funds for
ceremonies,  20X for  buying  clothes,  and 1OZ for buying  "general  merchandise"
(1983:69).
35.  The  optimum  size,  or the  range  of  acceptable  sizes,  may  vary  with  the  task,
and  with  the  characters  of  the  members  or leaders.  It  might  also  vary  by  gender,
by ethnic  group,  and  by age:  little  is  yet  known  on these  questions.
36.  In 1988,  lower ranking Gambian  workers in both the Ministry of Finance and
Trade  and  the  USAID  mission  in  Banjul  had  unsupervised  osusu  groups.  Why  salaried
workers  with access  to banks use osusu  groups  too (or  instead)  is a useful
question  for further  research.  It should  also  be asked  the other  way around.
Convenience,  diversification  to  avoid  risks,  and  secrecy  about  one's  total  wealth
are  likely  reasons.
37.  That  mixed-sex  kafo  and  osusu  financial  groups  are  more  common  in  the  cities
and large  towns  appears  to result  partly  from  the  fact  that salaries  put some
men  and  women,  particularly  single  ones,  into  comparable  financial  circumstances.
38.  For  some  case  studies  see  Mann  et  al.  1989.  Notable  institutional  experiments
in  group-based  lending  have  included  "solidarity  groups"  of  Accion  International
in  Latin  America  and  the  equally  famous  Grameen  Bank  in Bangladesh.
39. In 1986,  48Z  of the money supply of The Gambia was reported to be outside
of the banking system (Ramamurthy  1986:  25).
40.  The  postal  savings  system  is  marginally  more accessible  but still  hard to
withdraw  from,  and  useless  as  a source  of credit.
41.  A few,  including  Mauritanian  shopkeepers,  said  that  they  did  not  bank  because
to  do  so  would  be  to  charge  interest,  an  act  discouraged  in  Islam.  However,  since
some of these  merchants  do charge interest  in informal  lending,  and since
Mauritanians  in  Senegal  and  The  Gambia  have  recently  been  victim  to  persecutions
requiring  temporary  flight,  the  stated  reason  is  probably  not  to  be  taken  at  face
value.
42.  In the 1987  survey,  when farmers  were asked whether they like the idea of
mobile  banks,  60Z replied  yes, 112  replied  no, and  292  were uncommitted,  some
of these  lacking  familiarity  with the  idea.  The  Agricultural  Development  Bank
had tried  mobile  banks  in the  early  1980s,  but it  was unable  to sustain  them
before  it failed.
43.  The inflation  and current  interest  rate figures  are from the  Ministry  of
Finance  and  Trade.- 56 -
44.  These  might  be minimized  by a group-based  approach.
45.  This is doubtless  what Shakespeare  meant  by "borrowing  dulls  the edge  of
husbandry"  (Hamlet  I,  3: 75).
46.  Except,  of  course,  where  loans  are  not  collected.  Some  of these  factors  may
help  explain  why  Gambians  have  tended  to  use  institutions  for  borrowing  more  than
for  saving.
47. Clark (1987)  concludes  that the Gambian  co-operative  system  is now too
precarious  to merit farmers'  investment,  and therefore  to deserve  any  major
savings  component  in  credit  at present.57
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